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Abstract. This paper argues that the Federal Reserve’s failure to control inflation during the 
1970s was due to constraints imposed by the political environment. Members of the Fed 
understood that a serious attempt to tackle inflation would be unpopular with the public and 
would generate opposition from Congress and the Executive branch. The result was a 
commitment to the policy of gradualism, under which the Fed would attempt to reduce inflation 
with mild policies that would not trigger an outright recession, and premature abandonment of 
anti-inflation policies at the first sign of recession. Alternative explanations, in particular 
misperceptions of the natural rate of unemployment and misunderstandings of the nature of 
inflation, do not provide a complete explanation for Fed policy at key turning points during the 
Great Inflation. Evidence for this explanation of Fed behavior is found in Minutes and 
Transcripts of FOMC meetings and speeches of Fed chairmen. Empirical analysis verifies that 
references to the political environment at FOMC meetings are correlated with the stance of 
monetary policy during this period. 
 
 
JEL classification: E5, E6, N1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What accounts for the Federal Reserve’s failure to control inflation in the United States in 
the 1970s? Two theories have gained prominence in recent years. One, the “mismeasurement” 
hypothesis, is associated with the work of Orphanides (2002, 2003, 2004) and Orphanides and 
Williams (2004). According to this view, during the period of the Great Inflation staff 
economists at the Fed and elsewhere consistently overestimated the productive capacity of the 
economy. These faulty estimates, combined with an implicit policy rule that placed strong 
emphasis on maintaining full employment relative to inflation control, resulted in a monetary 
policy that was consistently overexpansionary. Control began to be exerted over inflation in the 
early 1980s when policymakers began operating according to a more realistic estimate of 
potential output.  
 Romer and Romer (2002) and Nelson (2006) offer another explanation which I call the 
“misunderstandings” hypothesis. These authors argue that prior to the early 1980s policymakers 
subscribed to a variety of beliefs about the economy that led them to underestimate the 
inflationary impact of monetary policy. These beliefs included the idea that there existed a 
permanent tradeoff between inflation and unemployment; that the natural rate of unemployment 
was very low; that monetary policy did not have a substantial effect on inflation; and that the 
output costs of disinflation were very high. According to this view, the turning point in the battle 
against inflation came when policymakers in the early 1980s adopted a modern view of the role 
of monetary policy in controlling inflation. 
 This paper advances another view. I argue that the Fed was constrained from taking 
action against inflation by a political environment that was unsupportive of high interest rates, 
slow growth, and high unemployment. Other authors including Kettl (1986), Havrilesky (1993), 
Wells (1994), DeLong (1997), Mayer (1998), Matusow (1998), Meltzer (2005), and Hetzel 
(2008), have argued that political constraints bear some responsibility for the Fed’s inability to 
sustain an anti-inflation policy. This paper’s contribution is to produce narrative and econometric 
support for the role of political considerations from an exhaustive study of Minutes and 
Transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings, focusing especially on 
monetary policy turning points during the Great Inflation. 
 A review of FOMC documents identifies six key turning points during the Great 
Inflation: In mid- to late 1972, the Fed held off on tightening monetary policy in the face of 
intensifying inflationary pressures. While the inflation rate was suppressed because of price 
controls, excessive GDP growth and falling unemployment created inflationary pressures that 
burst out in 1973. The Fed made the same error in 1977-1978. Though the annual inflation rate 
rose continuously during this period, the Fed maintained an expansionary policy throughout 
1977, tightening only modestly in spring and fall 1978. These efforts were not enough to prevent 
a burst of inflation in 1979. In early 1970, late 1973, and late 1974, the Fed eased policy 
prematurely during attempts at disinflation. In each case the decision to ease came at the first 
sign of economic weakness and before any progress had been made in reducing inflation. 
Finally, in 1981 the Fed maintained its tight policy despite high unemployment, easing in 1982 
only after inflation had fallen considerably. The decision to maintain tight policy during the 
1981-82 recession signalled the end of the Great Inflation. 
 Misperceptions of the economy’s productive capacity and misunderstandings of the 
relationship between monetary policy and inflation may have influenced the Fed’s choices at 
these turning points by causing the Fed to understimate the impact its actions would have on 
inflation. The FOMC documents, however, make clear that at each turning point FOMC 
members were aware that inflationary pressures were strong and that the decision to ease would 
result in an increase in inflation. These policy choices were not driven by misestimation or 
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misunderstandings. They were conscious decisions to gear monetary policy towards promoting 
economic expansion at the cost of higher inflation motivated by the Fed’s understanding that the 
public and government would not tolerate a tight monetary policy. Misperceptions and 
misunderstandings may have facilitated the Fed’s actions by causing it to underestimate the 
inflationary costs of expansionary policy, but the root cause of the Fed’s policy decisions was 
political calculation. 
 In arguing that the political environment affected monetary policy decisions during the 
period of the Great Inflation, I do not mean to suggest that the Fed was simply carrying out 
orders from the President or Congress. In general the political environment affected policy in a 
more subtle way by defining the range of policy alternatives the Fed considered to be acceptable. 
The Fed rarely found itself in a position of having to respond to direct commands from Congress 
or the President because it was careful not to test the limits of its authority too forcefully. Arthur 
Burns, Chair of the Fed from 1970 to 1978, articulated this view in a widely-quoted speech given 
after he left the Fed (Burns, 1979, especially pp. 15-16). Looking back at the period of the Great 
Inflation, he explained that the Fed was unwilling to frustrate “the will of Congress to which it 
was responsible” by declining to accommodate inflationary fiscal and social policies. When the 
Fed did contract monetary policy, the criticism its actions provoked forced the Fed to back off 
before success was achieved. Faced with these political constraints, the Fed’s policy consisted of 
“testing and probing the limits of its freedom to undernourish the inflation” while warding off 
hostile legislation. The result was periods of overly expansionary monetary policy punctuated by 
abandoned efforts at disinflation and a ratcheting up of inflation throughout the decade. 
Minutes and transcripts from FOMC meetings support Burns’ account. Members of the 
FOMC frequently expressed concerns about the political consequences of contractionary policy. 
These concerns took two forms. At times Committee members warned that the pursuit of 
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contractionary policy would elicit a direct negative reaction from Congress or the President such 
as passage of legislation that would restrict the Fed’s independence. More often, Committee 
members argued that if contractionary monetary policy resulted in recession, Congress and the 
President would respond with an expansionary fiscal policy. The Fed would then be forced to 
back away from monetary contraction lest its policies be seen to be inconsistent with the policy 
objectives of the elected branches of government. In either case, the evidence suggests that the 
Fed would have adopted policies more likely to contain inflation had such policies had the 
support of political actors outside the Fed. 
The political constraints hypothesis explains the key features of monetary policy during 
the period of the Great Inflation. First, it explains why the Fed delayed taking action against 
inflation during periods of economic expansion and why it prematurely abandoned disinflation 
efforts in the early years of the Great Inflation. Second, it explains the adoption of “stop-go” 
monetary policy. When the unemployment rate was relatively low and inflation was rising, the 
Fed was able to take advantage of political support for restraining inflation by raising interest 
rates. But as soon as the unemployment rate began to rise, that political support evaporated and 
the Fed came under pressure to lower rates. Third, the political constraints hypothesis explains 
the adoption of “gradualism” as a strategy for reducing inflation. The gradualist approach to 
reducing inflation involved contracting monetary policy enough to reduce GDP growth below its 
potential level but not enough to cause GDP to fall or unemployment to rise to intolerable levels. 
In effect, gradualism amounted to the policy of pursuing an anti-inflation policy up to but not 
exceeding the limits of the political system’s willingness to tolerate slow growth and rising 
unemployment. Fourth, the constraints placed on the Fed also explain the Fed’s enthusiasm for 
macroeconomic policy coordination with other agencies of government. The Fed recognized that 
the modest degree of tightening to which it was willing to commit would not by itself have a 
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marked impact on inflation.1 For this reason the Fed repeatedly pushed for the other agencies of 
government to cooperate in attempts to control inflation through fiscal, regulatory, and energy 
policy. At times (especially 1971-72 and 1977-78) coordination meant that the Fed effectively 
accepted the policy priorities of the President rather than trying to fight inflation on its own. At 
others (notably 1975-76 and briefly in 1978), the adoption of anti-inflation programs by the 
executive branch allowed the Fed to pursue a more restrictive monetary policy. Finally, the 
political constraints hypothesis explains why the Fed was able to bring inflation under control 
after 1979. In 1979 inflation reached a crisis level and a public mandate formed to take painful 
measures to reduce it. During 1979 and 1980, the Carter Administration’s declaration that 
inflation was “public enemy number one,” combined with the public’s perception that the 
Administration’s economic policies were ineffectual, created an opening for the Federal Reserve 
to take the lead in fighting inflation. Paul Volcker skillfully used this opening to create a new 
role for the Federal Reserve as the independent guardian of price stability.  
 The next section of this paper constructs a history of monetary policy from 1969 to 1981 
with a focus on the turning points between attempts at disinflation and growth promotion. This 
section describes how the political environment in which the Fed operated constrained its 
monetary policy choices. It also discusses the events that led to the policy changes under Paul 
Volcker’s chairmanship. Section 3 briefly discusses the role of misestimation and 
misunderstanding in facilitating expansionary policy during the Great Inflation. Section 4 
                                                 
1 Nelson and Romer and Romer interpret statements to this effect as evidence that policymakers at the Fed and 
elsewhere did not believe in the efficacy of monetary policy. But almost invariably when Arthur Burns or other Fed 
officials made such statements in FOMC meetings or public speeches, they were referring to the effectiveness of 
monetary policy actions within the range of political acceptability. As evidenced by his 1979 speech, Burns believed 
that a sufficiently strong monetary contraction was capable of having a large effect on inflation. A working paper 
version of this paper presents more evidence from public speeches that the Fed chairmen believed that the ability of 
contractionary monetary policy to reduce inflation was limited primarily by political rather than structural 
constraints. 
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presents a number of statistical tests of the political constraints hypothesis using data generated 
from the FOMC Minutes and Transcripts. Section 5 concludes.  
2. MONETARY POLICY DURING THE GREAT INFLATION 
 This study is based on an analysis of Federal Reserve documents from 1969 to 1981, 
including Records of Policy Actions (RPAs) from the Federal Reserve Bulletin; Memoranda of 
Discussion from FOMC meetings (Minutes) for 1969 to 1975 (provided by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System); and transcripts of FOMC meetings (Transcripts) for 
1976 to 1981.2 I use RPAs (and especially information on the interest rate and monetary targets 
contained therein) to identify dates at which the Fed switched from a relatively tight to relatively 
loose monetary policy and vice versa.3 The documents are used to construct a narrative analysis 
of monetary policy decisions made during the Great Inflation period with a particular focus on 
the periods around turning points.4 Figures 1 to 5 present data to supplement the narrative 
analysis. The figures show: the actual and target federal funds rates; actual revised GDP deflator 
inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth rates; and current and two-quarter ahead Greenbook 
forecasts of the corresponding variables. The figures also mark the tightening and easing dates. 
Finally, the Minutes and Transcripts are the sources of statements by members of the FOMC 
referring to political constraints that form the basis of the empirical work in Section 4. 
2.1 The first disinflation attempt, 1969-1970 
                                                 
2 Transcripts for the years 1978 to 1981 were obtained from the Board of Governors website. These are verbatim 
transcripts edited by Board staff. Transcripts for 1976 to 1977 were obtained from the Gerald Ford Presidential 
Library. These are the raw, unedited transcripts; where necessary I made minor changes marked in brackets to 
clarify what I took to be the speaker’s meaning. Forecast data shown in the figures that appear in the paper are from 
Greenbooks prepared for each meeting of the FOMC. These were provided by the Board of Governors. The federal 
funds rate target series was compiled from attachments to the Memoranda of Discussions and the Records of Policy 
Actions. 
3 Policy switched from loose to tight on 12/17/68, 1/16/73, 3/18-19/73, and 10/6/79; policy switched from tight to 
loose on 2/10/70, 10/16/73-12/17-18/73, 10/14-15/74, and 10/5/82. These dates correspond closely, but not exactly, 
to changes in the Boschen Mills (1995) index. Further details are in an appendix available from the author. 
4 The narrative is kept fairly brief because of space constraints. A more detailed history is contained in a working 
paper version of this paper available on the author’s website. 
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 The origins of the Great Inflation in the mid-1960s have been discussed at length 
elsewhere (Kettl, 1986; DeLong, 1997; Meltzer, 2005 and others). The Fed under  Chairman 
McChesney Martin had allowed the inflation rate to creep up during the late 1960s. The first 
attempt to deal with inflation in 1966 was quickly abandoned. But with inflationary pressures 
building, the Fed finally committed to a sustained monetary contraction in December 1968. 
We know in retrospect that ending the Great Inflation would require the Fed to maintain a 
tight monetary policy through a period of high unemployment. The Minutes of FOMC meetings 
in 1969 suggest that the Fed then had a greater willingness to pay the necessary price for ending 
inflation than it would have at any time during the 1970s. While members of the FOMC 
repeatedly expressed their hope that the economy would avoid recession, Chairman Martin 
argued that the Fed needed to sustain its policy, even at the risk of higher unemployment, until 
inflation expectations were broken. In July, for example, Martin responded to concerns about the 
weakening economy by arguing that “inflationary psychology remained the main economic 
problem… It would be a mistake… to take any action that might reinforce inflationary 
expectations just at the time when some weakening in those expectations might be developing” 
(Minutes 7/15/69, p. 80). In August he advocated against easing on the grounds that “it was 
important for the System not to get into a position of validating the expectations of numerous 
skeptics who believed the System would ease its policy as soon as it heard the words ‘recession’ 
or ‘overkill’” (Minutes, 8/12/69, p. 77-78). Martin’s opposition to easing continued through the 
end of 1969, even after September when the staff economists began to warn specifically of an 
imminent recession. The federal funds rate rose from six percent at the end of 1968 to nine 
percent in June, and stayed around that level until January 1970. 
It was recognized that the Fed’s tightening policy put it at odds with the desires of the 
new Nixon Administration. In the meeting of April 1969, Governor Maisel noted that 
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Administration officials “had made clear that they wanted to attempt a gradualist approach to the 
ultimate goal of price stability” and that “they had repeatedly stated their hope that the Federal 
Reserve would cooperate in such an approach.” (Minutes, 4/1/69, p. 66-69) For this reason, 
Maisel urged the FOMC to ease policy to avoid recession. In the August meeting Mr. Morris 
argued that “the policy of gradualism had been abandoned so far as monetary policy was 
concerned.” He accused the Committee of following a policy “designed to produce a faster 
response in the price level in 1969 at the risk of producing a modest recession in 1970.” 
(Minutes, 8/12/69, p. 34-36) Despite these misgivings the tight policy stance remained in place 
through 1969. At the January 1970 meeting, Martin’s last as Chairman, the Committee adopted 
language in the directive signaling a slight relaxation of the degree of restraint. Despite signs that 
the economy was weakening, however, the Committee rejected an outright expansionary move. 
The federal funds rate, which was close to nine percent in the week of the meeting, stayed above 
nine percent for the rest of the month. Thus Martin’s term ended with the Fed still committed to 
a contractionary course, despite the fact that by that time the economy was in recession. 
 Arthur Burns replaced Martin as Chair at the beginning of 1970. The Fed began to ease in 
earnest following the February 1970 meeting: within a month the federal funds rate had fallen 
from nine percent to under eight percent. Beginning in June the easing accelerated, with the 
federal funds rate falling from 7.6 percent to 4.1 percent by January 1971.  
Political considerations arising from the unwillingness of the Nixon Administration and 
Congress to sacrifice economic growth for control of inflation played a large role in the decision 
to ease. As noted by many authors (e.g. Wells 1994, p. 42), the Nixon Administration expected 
Chairman Burns to push the Fed to adopt a more expansionary monetary policy in support of the 
Administration’s gradualist approach to reducing inflation. Burns is widely credited with 
resisting pressures for ease, and the Administration did not get as expansionary a policy as it 
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desired. But it was clear to members of the FOMC that there was no political support for a 
continuation of the contractionary policy of 1969. Consequently, after February 1970 the Fed’s 
objective was not to reduce the inflation rate but to do as much as possible to stimulate economic 
growth without significantly worsening the inflation problem. 
  Burns’ main argument for easing, which was shared by several others on the Committee, 
was that a recession would cause the Administration and Congress to adopt more expansionary 
fiscal policies to stimulate growth. Members of the FOMC do not seem to have considered the 
possibility that in such a case the Fed would be able to offset the effects of the fiscal expansion 
with higher interest rates (as the Volcker Fed did in the early 1980s). Instead, it was assumed that 
the Fed would have to fall in line behind the Administration’s policy. Thus in the March meeting 
Chairman Burns argued that  
if the weakening in the economy became pronounced and monetary policy remained 
highly restrictive, within a few months there was likely to be an increase in Federal 
spending so large as to carry a real danger of a resurgence of inflationary pressures. He 
made that statement with confidence on the basis of intimate knowledge of the thinking 
of members of the Administration and some knowledge of Congressional thinking. 
(Minutes 3/10/70, p. 61) 
 
At one point the feared consequences of an overly restrictive policy took a harder edge. 
In the April meeting Burns urged the Committee to focus its attention on the unemployment 
problem, arguing that if it failed to do so Congress was poised to pass legislation that would 
reduce the Fed’s independence by requiring the Fed to make low interest housing loans to 
qualified borrowers. In this case, Burns argued, “it would be only a matter of time before the 
Federal Reserve would find itself in the position of some Latin American central banks.” 
(Minutes, 4/7/70, p. 52-53) 
 Throughout 1970 members of the Committee were atuned to the level of unemployment 
that would be considered politically unacceptable. Mr. Galusha noted that the Fed’s projected 
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level of unemployment for the end of 1970, 5.1 percent, was “by current political standards, 
rather a high average rate” (Minutes, 3/10/70, p. 66). Mr. Heflin observed that unemployment in 
the range of 5.5 to 6 percent “would very likely create social and political pressures that might 
well make it impossible for the Committee to stick to any path of moderate expansion” (Minutes, 
6/23/70, p. 23). Similar arguments were made by Mr. Galusha (Minutes, 7/21/70, p. 46-47) and 
Mr. Coldwell (Minutes, 12/15/70, p. 37-38).  
 As the economy continued to weaken through 1970, the Nixon Administration and 
members of Congress pushed for a more expansionary policy. The President’s Council of 
Economic Advisors argued that the Fed should aim for a nine percent increase in the money 
supply (Wells, 1994, p. 61). While Burns resisted an expansion of this magnitude, by the end of 
the year he was pushing the FOMC to increase the money supply growth rate in order to make up 
for the sluggish growth earlier in the year. At the meeting of January 12, 1971, Burns made a 
plea for the Committee to take further aggressive actions to fight recession. The issue for Burns 
was “credibility” with the Administration; by this he seems to have meant that if the Fed was not 
perceived to be pursuing a strong growth policy, the Administration would resort to an 
expansionary fiscal policy. “The credibility of the Federal Reserve,” he argued, “would be 
greatly strengthened if it became apparent that the Committee was seeking to make up the recent 
shortfalls [in money growth]. (Minutes, 1/12/71, p. 36-37) 
By the spring of 1971 monetary policy was on a more firmly expansionary path with the 
federal funds rate below four percent by March. At the April 6 meeting, Burns seemed to 
indicate that the measures the Fed had taken since January had satisfied the Administration.  
Chairman Burns said it was now recognized within the Administration to a much greater 
degree than earlier that the monetary authorities had done their job well, and that if any 
further stimulation was needed it would have to be provided by fiscal policy. (Minutes, 
4/6/71, p. 22) 
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 Despite the fact that the Fed’s inflation forecasts were higher in early 1971 than they had 
been when the disinflation effort began in 1969, the Fed was now firmly committed to an 
expansionary policy. 
2.2 The expansion of 1971-73 
 From 1970 to 1971 the economy struggled through a period of high unemployment and 
slow growth in real GNP. In response, monetary policy turned strongly expansionary. By 1972, 
however, economic growth was running at annual rates exceeding five percent and 
unemployment was falling rapidly from its peak of six percent in 1971:Q3. Inflation remained 
subdued until late 1972, largely because of price controls adopted in August 1971. At the end of 
1972 and especially in 1973, the inflationary pressures that had built up over the previous year 
burst out. The Fed had begun to tighten in January 1973, but it was too late to avoid a dramatic 
rise in inflation. In retrospect, the failure to raise interest rates more aggressively in 1972 proved 
to have been a critical mistake.  
Strategic-political considerations were the most important reason for the Fed’s failure to 
act in 1972. In August 1971 the Nixon Administration had announced its New Economic Policy 
aimed at stimulating growth, reducing the balance of payments deficit, and reducing inflation. As 
ultimately passed by Congress, the plan amounted  to a fiscal expansion to stimulate growth 
coupled with an incomes policy to control inflation. During the fall of 1971, the FOMC debated 
whether it should gear monetary policy towards supporting the Administration’s growth 
objectives or its inflation objectives. This debate occurred in a political environment that was 
hostile to policies that raised the risk of recession. The Administration initiated a heavy-handed 
campaign to pressure the Fed to continue its expansionary policies in order to avoid recession 
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before the 1972 election.5 For their part, members of Congress repeatedly sought a commitment 
from the Fed to maintain an expansionary policy (see e.g. Chairman Burns’ testimony to the 
Joint Economic Committee, excerpted in Minutes 2/15/72, p. 47).  
 By early 1972 the FOMC had set monetary policy on a firmly expansionary track. A 
desire to be seen as supporting the Administration’s economic agenda – and concern about the 
consequences of not being so seen – clearly played a role in the decision to adopt this course of 
action. In the meeting of December 1971, for example, Chairman Burns called the Committee’s 
attention to the slow growth in monetary aggregates at the end of the year. Reminding the 
Committee that the President’s program was intended “not only to stabilize the price level but 
also to stimulate growth in the economy,” he warned that because of the slow monetary growth 
rates “some people were now asking whether the Federal Reserve was deliberately moving to a 
restraining policy so as to nullify what the Administration, with the support of Congress, was 
attempting to accomplish.” (Minutes, 12/14/71, p. 48-51) Burns reiterated these political 
concerns in the January 1972 meeting. Burns noted that he would soon have to testify before the 
Joint Economic Committee of Congress to “give an accounting to the Congress on how the 
Federal Reserve had been contributing to the national objectives of economic growth and orderly 
reduction in the rate of inflation” (Minutes, 1/11/72, p. 62).  He stressed that the program adopted 
in 1971 emphasized economic growth and had the support of the President and both parties in 
Congress, concluding that    
…  unless the aggregates now began to grow at adequate rates he would become fearful 
about the future of the economy, and he would also feel that there might be some validity 
in a charge that the System was not supporting the policies of the Administration and 
Congress. (Minutes, 1/11/72, p. 62) 
  
                                                 
5 The Administration’s actions, including attempts to stack the Board of Governors with inflationists and leaks to the 
press falsely accusing Burns of demanding a pay raise, are well-documented (see Ehrlichman 1982; DeLong 1997; 
Wells 1994; Kettle 1986). 
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The FOMC’s decision to gear monetary policy toward supporting the Administration’s 
growth objectives rather than controlling inflation meant that for the rest of 1972 the Committee 
essentially ceded responsibility for inflation to the Administration. The attitude is epitomized in a 
statement by Mr. Maisel (endorsed by Chairman Burns) at the meeting of April 18: 
In his judgment, Mr. Maisel continued, to accommodate GNP growth in the second half 
at the projected rate [10 to 10-1/2 percent] would be consistent with the nation’s goals. 
The Administration had indicated that GNP should grow by at least that much, if not 
more, and Congress would view such a rate as low. If a problem of excessive expansion 
developed in 1973, it would not have been created by the Federal Reserve… (Minutes, 
4/18/72, p. 53-54) 
 
In the same meeting, Mr. Brimmer argued essentially for an abdication of the Fed’s 
responsibility for fighting inflation in light of the NEP. 
The significant point was that the Administration had decided [in mid-August 1971] – 
with the support of the Congress and the Federal Reserve – that the way to solve the 
problem of inflation was to apply direct controls rather than to slow the rate of economic 
growth and increase excess capacity. If more effective means of fighting inflation were 
needed they should be sought in tighter controls, perhaps along the lines the Chairman 
had suggested, and not through monetary policy. (Minutes, 4/18/72, p. 57-58) 
 
 An additional barrier to any impulse the Committee may have had to tighten monetary 
policy in 1972 came from the Committee on Interest and Dividends. In the face of rising 
aggregate demand, the public was chafing at the Administration’s wage and price controls. 
Controls on interest rates and dividends through the CID were seen as a signal that the burden of 
price controls would be shared equally across income classes. Members of the FOMC 
understood that, were the Fed to tighten enough to increase interest rates, the price controls 
would come under attack. In that event, the Nixon Administration would push back against the 
Fed, with uncertain consequences for the Fed as an institution. These concerns were discussed on 
several occasions in the fall of 1972 (see Burns, Minutes, 8/15/72, p. 74-75; Hayes, Minutes, 
9/19/72, p. 47). In September two members of the Committee suggested that the Fed raise its 
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target for the federal funds rate despite the constraints posed by the CID. Burns spoke in 
opposition, warning that a decision by the Fed to raise interest rates might cause the CID to set 
guidelines for interest rates. “If guidelines were established,” Burns argued, “the result would be 
a confontation between the Federal Reserve and the Executive establishment – a prospect that 
was extremely disturbing.” (Minutes, 9/19/72, p. 70) 
Because of the Fed’s commitment to using monetary policy to promote economic growth, 
the federal funds rate remained low throughout 1972. The Fed finally moved to a more restrictive 
policy in January 1973. Weakening economic conditions justified such a move, but a number of 
changes in the political environment also facilitated the Fed’s decision to tighten. First, the 
unemployment rate had fallen to a level (around 5 percent) that the public, Congress, and the 
Administration would accept as close to full employment, so the Fed could not be accused of 
strangling the recovery prematurely. Second, the 1972 election was over. Finally, the uncertainty 
about the likely reaction of the Committee on Interest and Dividends to an interest rate increase 
seems to have been resolved in a way that gave the Fed more leeway than it had had earlier 
(Burns, Minutes, 1/16/73, p. 24).  
2.3 The 1973 disinflation 
 The Fed’s tightening move in January 1973 was only a half-hearted attempt at 
disinflation. The Fed understood that in the prevailing political environment an outright 
recession – specifically negative growth or an unemployment rate in excess of 6 percent – was 
politically unacceptable and therefore unsustainable. 
[Mr. Morris] was afraid that if a 6 per cent unemployment rate were to be generated, the 
consensus between the Administration and the Congress calling for restraint in Federal 
expenditures might well be destroyed. A 5 per cent unemployment rate might be tolerated 
for an extended period of time but not a 6 per cent rate. Chairman Burns agreed that a 6 
per cent unemployment rate could well lead to a massive Federal budget deficit and also 
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to a marked easing in monetary policy, thereby laying the foundation for further inflation 
in the future. (Minutes, 6/18/73, p. 33-34)6 
 
For this reason the Fed adopted a gradualist approach to disinflation: a modest tightening 
of monetary policy intended to cause growth to slow but not fall into negative territory, 
unemployment to creep up into the 5-6 percent range, and the inflation rate to stabilize or decline 
by a small amount. The Fed never attempted a substantial reduction in inflation. 
That the Fed’s failure to make progress against inflation in 1973 was intentional and not a 
result of misunderstandings about the economy is evident from a staff presentation at the March 
meeting. At this meeting, the staff analyzed alternative monetary policy strategies for 1973-1974 
(Minutes 3/19/73, Table 8). The analysis presented numerical estimates showing that a tight 
policy would cause unemployment to rise and inflation to fall by the end of 1974 while a loose 
policy would have the opposite effect. Mr. Partee, the Senior Economist, acknowledging that the 
more contractionary strategy was politically unfeasible, advocated a middle ground. 
To adopt a substantially more restrictive policy that carries with it the danger of 
stagnation or recession would seem unreasonable and counterproductive. As 
unemployment rose, there would be strong social and political pressure for expansive 
actions so that the policy would very likely have to be reversed before it succeeded in 
tempering either the rate of inflation or the underlying sources of inflation… The best 
solution in the present difficult situation, I believe would entail a slowing in the economic 
expansion to the minimum sustainable rate which would appear to be in the 3 to 4 per 
cent range. The unemployment rate would tend to drift upward once this slower growth 
rate had been sustained for a while. Even so, progress in reducing inflaton would 
probably be modest – all that can be expected in today’s environment from aggregate 
demand management measures. (Minutes, 3/19-20/73, p. 16-17) 
 
The FOMC adopted Mr. Partee’s gradualist policy. According to the staff’s projections, 
the policy would raise the unemployment rate to 5.4 percent while keeping the inflation rate 
                                                 
6 Similar statements were made by other Committee members on numerous occasions throughout the year (see for 
example Mr. Partee, Minutes, 3/19-20/73, p. 16-17; Mr. Sheehan, Minutes, 7/17/73, p. 43; Mr. Gramley, Minutes, 
9/18/73, p. 13; Mr. Eastburn, Minutes, 9/18/73, p. 48). 
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steady. This satisfied the political requirement that the unemployment rate remain under 6 
percent while sacrificing any hope of a substantial reduction in inflation. 
 The Fed raised the federal funds rate target gradually through the first half of 1973, from 
6 percent in January to 10.5 percent in August. As it did so, Committee members repeatedly 
gauged the degree of support the policy was attracting from Congress and the Administration. At 
the June meeting, with the unemployment rate still only 5 percent, Chairman Burns cited the 
absence of a “sharp attack in the press and in Congress” as evidence that remarked that the Fed 
appeared to be operating within politically acceptable bounds (Minutes, 6/19/73, p. 110) 
But in the second half of the year there were indications that economic growth was 
slowing. As the economy slowed, growth in the money supply fell below announced target 
ranges. In the eyes of Congress, the money growth targets represented the Fed’s commitment to 
maintaining economic expansion. As Chairman Burns argued in a conference call on October 10, 
slow growth in the aggregates would be seen as a violation of this commitment. 
System officials had repeatedly stated to Congress and the public that the Federal 
Reserve intended to pursue a monetary policy that would permit moderate growth of the 
monetary aggregates. If the System were to allow the period of very low or negative 
growth in the money stock to continue much longer, it would not only be damaging its 
credibility; it would be failing to meet its responsibilities to the economy and to the 
nation. (Minutes, 10/10/73, p. 4-5) 
 
In the meeting of October 16 Mr. Morris called for increasing growth in the monetary 
aggregates, arguing that “Market participants and the public at large had been assured, through 
statements by the Chairman and in other ways, that the Federal Reserve would not permit the 
monetary aggregates to contract for a prolonged period, and he was concerned about the possible 
reactions to a failure to make good on that commitment. (Minutes, 10/16/73, p. 47-48) 
Mr. Morris advocated again in November for increased money supply growth, arguing 
that “if a recession did develop by next spring, he would want the record to show that the 
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Committee had recognized the problems generated by the energy crisis and had moved promptly 
toward ease” (Minutes 11/20/73, p. 91). Chairman Burns expressed his sympathy with this 
statement. And in December, Mr. MacLaury warned of the political consequences of failing to 
act against the coming economic slowdown. 
… Mr. MacLaury said it was his impression that the Committee had been concerned last 
winter about possible reactions in the Congress if interest rates had been allowed to rise 
rapidly at that time. It seemed to him that there would be even greater grounds for 
concern about reactions if the Committee should fail to evidence in some way its 
recognition of the change in the economic outlook. The directors of the Minneapolis 
Reserve Bank did not believe that discount rate action would be appropriate at this time, 
but they did feel that – to use the words of Chairman Burns – a modest and cautious 
easing of monetary policy would be desirable. (Minutes, 12/18/73, p. 81) 
 
The Fed relaxed its tightening policy slightly in October. By December, with the oil crisis 
threatening to accelerate the slowdown in growth, the Fed moved to a cautiously expansionary 
policy. The federal funds rate fell from 10.8 percent in the last week of September to 9.9 percent 
by the end of the year and 9 percent by February. In moving toward ease members of the FOMC 
were well aware that they were abandoning the effort to control inflation. Mr. Partee 
acknowledged as much in the November meeting. 
A reduction in money growth to a 4 per cent rate could be expected to slow the rate of 
inflation significantly by 1975, but at the cost of a protracted decline in real output and a 
sharp rise in the unemployment rate. Alternatively, if money growth is raised to around a 
6-1/2 per cent rate, the consequent strengthening in economic expansion would be likely 
to hold the unemployment rate at 5 per cent or below until very late in 1975, but at the 
cost of an acceleration in the pace of inflation… Given the present state of the economy, 
monetary policy must make its tradeoff between very unsatisfactory choices as to 
employment and price objectives. I believe that the only feasible course is the middle 
one. (Minutes 11/19/73, p. 18). 
 
Chairman Burns echoed these sentiments in the December meeting, arguing that “however 
painful it might sound, the System had no choice but to validate price increases that stemmed 
from supply shortages, because a failure to do so would probably result in unacceptable declines 
in production, income, and employment.” (Minutes 12/18/73, p. 84) 
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 The inflation rate, which was 4.9 percent when the Fed switched to tight policy in the 
first quarter of 1973, was 8.2 percent in the fourth quarter, with policy now geared firmly toward 
supporting real activity rather than fighting inflation. 
2.4 The 1974 disinflation 
 In the early months of 1974 the inflation rate began to rise dramatically. In March, after a 
period of hesitation due to concern about the weakening economy, monetary policy was 
tightened. The federal funds rate target was increased from a range of 8.25-9.5 percent to 9-10.5 
percent. From there the target range was increased gradually, reaching 11.5-13 percent by July. 
By the end of the year this attempt at disinflation too would be abandoned before any progress 
had been made in reducing inflationary pressures. 
As in 1973, failure was built into the Fed’s strategy from the start. The Fed adopted a 
gradualist approach in order to avoid  triggering a political backlash. The strategy was described 
by Mr. Wallich in the March meeting in terms similar to those used a year earlier. 
… the objective should be to pursue a path of monetary growth such that economic 
activity continued to expand, but at a rate not necessarily much faster than its potential 
and perhaps even below. Although that might lead to political problems, real GNP would 
be rising and the economy would not be going into recession. At the same time, excess 
capacity would be increasing somewhat, providing some possibility of a gradual 
reduction in the rate of inflation. He would reject as both substantively and politically 
unsound a policy of so tight a rein that economic activity failed to recover at all and  
excess capacity built up rapidly. (Minutes, 3/19/74, p. 134-135) 
 
Similarly, in laying out the monetary policy alternatives in the April meeting, Mr. Partee 
rejected a “substantially more restrictive” policy that might “curb inflationary expectations, with 
desirable longer-run moderation in the actual rate of price increase” on the grounds that it would 
require markedly lower growth and higher unemployment (Minutes 4/16/74, p. 50). Thus a 
meaningful reduction in inflation was ruled out from the beginning. 
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 Because of the severity of the inflation problem the public, Congress, and the President 
seemed to have a greater tolerance for tight policy than they had had in 1973. This perception 
seems to have been a factor in the FOMC’s willingness to raise interest rates in spring and 
summer. In the March meeting, Chairman Burns remarked that “at the present time neither the 
Administration nor the Congress was urging the Federal Reserve to pursue a more expansionary 
course,” and that in fact one of the “distinguished liberal members of the Congress” had told him 
that the Fed was not doing as much as it could to fight inflation. (Minutes, 3/19/74, p. 139). In 
April Mr. Morris and Chairman Burns noted the lack of complaints from Congress about the 
interest rate increases that had taken place over the previous two months (Minutes, 4/16/74, p. 
72). In June, Mr. Balles reported that “Congressman Ullman, ranking majority member of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, had expressed his consent to a tight policy in a recent 
speech and that he thought that a majority of the Congress would concur in the System's efforts 
not only to slow the actual rate of price advance but also to dampen inflationary expectations.” 
Chairman Burns concurred that support for the Fed’s policy remained strong (Minutes, 6/18/74, 
p. 61-62). 
In the June and July meetings, as the economy weakened, Committee members debated 
how much slack in the economy the public and political system would tolerate. In June Mr. 
Wallich argued that the public would support a reduction in growth to the 2 to 3 percent range 
but would not tolerate an outright recession (Minutes, 6/18/74, p. 68). In July several Committee 
members argued that support for the Fed’s efforts in fighting inflation was strong enough that 
Congress and the public would tolerate growth rates as low as one percent. (Mr. Mayo, Minutes, 
7/16/74, p. 25; Mr. Hayes, Minutes, 7/16/74, p. 32-33; Mr. Francis, Minutes, 7/16/74, p. 32-33). 
In September, Mr. Morris repeated the notion expressed in earlier meetings that an 
unemployment rate of 6 percent was the maximum that was politically sustainable. A higher rate, 
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he argued, “would run the risk of generating political forces in favor of efforts to reduce the level 
of unemployment” which would force the abandonment of the Fed’s restrictive policy (Minutes, 
9/10/74, p. 83). Mr. Wallich and Mr. Sheehan concurred, Mr. Wallich arguing for a policy that 
would keep real GNP growth at around 2 percent per year and Mr. Sheehan expressing a 
willingness to see the unemployment rate rise to 6.5 to 7 percent (Minutes, 9/10/74, p. 68-70). 
Chairman Burns summarised his view of the Fed’s political room for maneuver in the July 
meeting: 
…  in his appearance before the House Ways and Means Committee yesterday... he had 
expressed his view that little or no economic growth could be expected for some months, 
and that that outlook should be accepted as a matter of policy under present 
circumstances. None of the members of the Ways and Means Committee, not even the 
more liberal members,  expressed any shock or criticism. More generally, in his many 
recent conversations with Congressmen he had found widespread acceptance of the need 
for slow economic growth; they reported that their constituents were more anxious about 
inflation than about unemployment. (Minutes, 7/16/74, p. 34) 
 
 The Fed maintained interest rates at a level above 11 percent through September. By 
October, however, the costs of disinflation appeared likely to exceed what the public and 
political system were willing to bear. In October the unemployment rate rose above the 6 percent 
threshold for the first time and was forecasted to rise to 7.5 percent by the end of 1975. GDP 
growth was estimated to be strongly negative for the first time as well. Mr. Morris and Mr. 
Partee argued that the coming recession would erode public support for the Fed’s anti-inflation 
policy. Furthermore, the Administration could be expected to adopt policies that would counter 
the Fed’s efforts and, in the long run, lead to more inflation (Minutes, 10/15/74, p. 31). Mr. 
Morris drew the implications for monetary policy. 
Mr. Morris said he believed that monetary policy had to be formulated on the assumption 
that the deeper the recession proved to be, the greater were the probabilities that 
Government policies adopted to combat it would produce too sharp a recovery. In order 
to restrain the contraction in business activity to the sort of mild recession that would be 
productive in reducing the rate of inflation over the longer run, the Committee had to be 
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willing to tolerate enough of a reduction in the Federal funds rate to raise the rate of 
monetary growth. (Minutes, 10/15/74, p. 69) 
 
Mr. Sheehan also advocated a substantial easing, noting that “the System was particularly 
vulnerable because of the way in which members of Congress perceived current monetary 
policy” (Minutes, 10/15/74, p. 73). The Committee ultimately adopted a modest easing at this 
time due to its continued concern with inflation. 
 Beginning in October, then, the Fed switched to a cautiously expansionary policy, 
lowering the federal funds target range to 9-10.5 percent from the 10.5-12 percent range set in 
September. The modest easing was continued in the months following, turning to a strongly 
expansionary policy in February 1975. By March the target range was 4.75-5.75. The February 
decision was clearly justified by the severity of the recession that was unfolding. The Fed may 
also have felt that it had some leeway to ease because it projected inflation to fall somewhat over 
the coming year (in this case the Fed’s forecasts were on target: the actual inflation rate for 1975 
was 7.6 percent, compared to the Fed’s forecast in February of 7.25 percent). At the same time 
the Committee felt pressure from various sources for a pro-growth stance. 
 Chairman Burns opened the February meeting with an acknowledgement that Congress 
was placing considerable pressure on the Federal Reserve. He pointed in particular to a 
concurrent resolution proposed by Senators Proxmire and  Humphrey instructing the Fed to 
increase the growth rate of the monetary aggregates. Stronger growth in the money supply, 
which Burns argued had been the Fed’s policy in any case, would help him make the case against 
this piece of legislation (Minutes, 2/19/75, p. 7-9). Mr. Balles argued that a reduction in the 
federal funds rate was dictated by “both the economics of the situation and Congressional 
concern” (Minutes, 2/19/75, p. 61). Political concerns were mentioned so prominently at this 
meeting that Chairman Burns felt compelled to argue that the Committee should not cave in to 
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political pressures (Minutes, 2/19/75, p. 61-62). But this statement brought a rebuttal from Mr. 
Eastburn. 
Finally, while the Federal Reserve System was an independent entity, its actions were 
being closely observed. He [Mr. Eastburn] was concerned that there would be critical 
public reaction to continuation of a monetary policy that had produced very little growth 
in the narrow money stock over the past 6 months, a period in which the economy was 
moving into the worst recession since the 1930's. Continued pursuit of such a policy and 
failure to stimulate the desired rates of monetary growth promptly could have some 
undesirable long-run implications. With those thoughts in mind, Mr, Eastburn said, he… 
would press to achieve more rapid monetary growth as quickly as possible. (Minutes, 
2/19/75, p. 68) 
 
2.5 The expansion of 1975-1979 
 As shown in Figure 4, from 1976 to 1979 the U.S. economy experienced strong growth, 
falling unemployment, and relentlessly increasing inflation. In retrospect it is clear that the Fed 
should have begun to tighten seriously toward the end of 1976, when the annual inflation rate 
topped six percent, or the end of 1977 when it reached 6.8 percent, or towards the end of 1978 
when it reached 7.3 percent, or early in 1979 when it topped 8 percent. But the Fed waited until 
October 1979 to launch an aggressive assault on inflation. The political constraints hypothesis 
offers a persuasive explanation for the Fed’s failure to tighten in the face of rising inflation. 
While the economy recovered slowly beginning in the spring of 1975, the Fed maintained 
a cautiously expansionary policy. Leading Democrats in Congress were urging a more 
expansionary policy, going so far as to introduce legislation forcing the Fed to increase its 
monetary growth rates. However, the Ford Administration strongly supported the thrust of the 
Fed’s policy and the Fed may have felt that this support provided it with “cover” to resist the 
entreaties of Congress (Kettl, pp. 131-134). 
The political environment changed with Jimmy Carter’s victory in the 1976 election. The 
Fed had eased somewhat as the economy weakened in the second half of 1976, but not by 
enough to prevent the unemployment rate from rising to almost 8 percent by the end of the year. 
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Carter had criticized the Fed’s cautious stance during the campaign, so it was doubtful that once 
in office he would provide the Fed with the political cover against pressure from Congress that 
President Ford had provided. And Carter had proposed a fiscal stimulus package in the campaign 
that was bound to work against the Fed’s anti-inflation policies. The Fed’s position was 
complicated further by the fact that Chairman Burns’ term of office would end in January 1978, 
and by all accounts he had a strong desire to be reappointed.  
 The first sign that the new Administration’s desire for economic expansion would 
weaken the Fed’s commitment to reducing inflation came in the FOMC’s discussion of its long-
run monetary targets in January 1977. The Committee’s policy had been to gradually reduce the 
target ranges for the monetary aggregates: in the previous year, for example, the range for M1 
growth had been reduced from 5-7.5 percent to 4.5-6.5 percent. A comparable reduction was on 
the table again at this meeting, but Chairman Burns argued that such a move would bring the Fed 
into conflict with the new Administration.  
[T]he new administration has proposed a fiscal plan for reducing unemployment and any 
lowering of monetary growth rates at this time would I’m quite sure be very widely 
interpreted… as an attempt on the part of the Federal Reserve to frustrate the efforts of a 
newly elected President, newly elected Congress, to get our economy, to use a popular 
phrase, “moving once again.” (Transcipt, 1/18/77, Tape 7, p. 1-4) 
 
To avoid the perception that the Fed’s policies were in conflict with those of the new 
Administration, Chairman Burns recommended that the Fed maintain the current target ranges 
for M1. Since Congress and the public paid less attention to M2 and M3, he argued, the Fed 
would make a small reduction in the lower bound of the target range for those variables. The 
result would be that the midpoints of the M2 and M3 range were precisely what they were six 
months earlier, and “this would be duly noted in our statement to the Congress.” The Committee 
adopted Burns’ proposal despite the reservations of several members of the Committee that the 
reduction in the M2 and M3 targets was purely cosmetic (Transcript, 1/18/77, Tape 7, p. 17; 
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Tape 8, p. 5,9). When the Committee reviewed the long range targets again in April and July, 
there were more calls for tightening. Burns again proposed superficial reductions that the 
Committee accepted. In the April meeting Mr. Volcker argued that Burns’ minimalist approach 
was appropriate given the political environment. 
If I really had my druthers and didn’t have to – if we were living really in an apolitical 
climate I suppose – I would have bought both ends of your [Burns’] thinking. I would 
have liked to see the M1 range reduced by half a percentage just on the low side and 
some reduction on both sides of the M2 and M3… Putting all this together I do think we 
ought to have some reduction in something. The easiest thing is the upper end of the 
range and the most meaningful thing, as minor as it is, the upper end of the range on M2 
and M3 by a half as you suggested… It’s not very extreme in the context that we’re 
talking, but just a half a per cent on the upper end of M2 and M3 is my margin of being 
satisfied that we have taken the minimum steps that we should take at this time. 
(Transcript, 4/19/77, Tape 5, p. 11) 
 
In July, Burns defended his approach on the grounds that a serious reduction in target 
ranges would increase the likelihood that Congress would pass legislation unfavorable to the Fed 
(the bills that became the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 1977). 
Gentlemen, we’re faced with a very hard decision. Speaking personally for a moment, I 
wish I could join my colleagues who would – were inclined to move towards somewhat 
lower growth rates. I have to – I wish I could. Tempermentally, yes. That’s what I would 
prefer to do. But I do have an obligation to this Committee and to the System, as well as 
to the country. I’ll have to testify before the [Congresional] Committee, I will have to 
defend whatever this Committee decides… I don’t mind being attacked, but I want to be 
in a position, really, to answer the attacks in an effective manner. And I find it very 
difficult to do that at the present time… and I am concerned about the legislation that we 
have before the Congress. (Transcript, 7/19/77, Tape F, p. 1-3) 
 
 As a result of the changed political environment, therefore, the Fed slowed the pace at 
which it was reducing its target ranges for monetary growth. At the same time, the Fed was 
allowing actual money supply growth to exceed the targets, reconciling the deviation using the 
policy of “base drift” (see e.g. Broaddus and Goodfriend, 1984). For some at the FOMC, base 
drift seems to have been consciously employed as a way of circumventing the targets and 
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avoiding a situation where the federal funds rate would have to increase significantly. Mr. 
Wallich, for example, was explicit about this in the July meeting. 
I would agree with the proposed proposal, Mr. Chairman, that you’ve made… But as a 
matter of principle, I think we are maneuvering here somewhat. We’re not hitting our 
targets and we’re using base drift to avoid being confronted with situations where interest 
rates would rise very sharply. I don’t think this is the kind of expansion that can stand 
sharp increases in interest rates and so I would like to see us take this action with the 
understanding that if we overshoot, well then, we’ll take another look. We do not 
absolutely hold to this target… I think one cannot take for granted that we can steadily 
continue this course without [loosing?] a rise in interest rates. That could be very 
troublesome. (Transcript, 7/19/77, Tape E, p. 5-6) 
 
 There developed a clear disconnect between the Fed’s professed goal of gradually 
reducing inflation by restricting the growth rate of the money supply and its unwillingness to 
allow interest rates to rise fast enough to reduce output growth. Mr. Roos called the Committee 
to task on this point in a remarkable series of exchanges. In September 1977, for example, Mr. 
Roos asked whether it was  
… not possible by the adroit conduct of monetary policy for this Committee really to 
have a very real effect on the trend of M1 and M2, instead of explaining afterwards why 
they did expand beyond what we wanted – what were our targets. I don’t know if I’m 
making my question clear, but I find myself frustrated sometimes in this regard… if our 
stated, and I assume understood objective is to gradually inch down the rate of inflation, 
and this has been often repeated, don’t we have some commitment to that goal even if it 
means some temporary dislocations of interest rate levels and things like that. I mean, in 
other words, isn’t that part of our mission too? (Transcript, 9/20/77, Tape 6, p. 1) 
 
Chairman Burns responded that other goals took precedence over achieving the monetary targets. 
Our job is not to worship at the shrine of a specific number that we agree upon at a given 
time. To the extent that we are going to worship at any shrine, our shrine is the 
performance of the economy. (Transcript, 9/20/77, Tape 6, p. 2) 
  
Similar exchanges occurred in January 1978 (Transcript, 1/17/78, p. 4-5) and March 
1978 (Transcript, 3/21/78, p. 34). In September Roos again expressed frustration with the 
Committee’s acquiescence to high money supply growth rates.  
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Roos: … As we went around the table, we all seemed to recognize that we do face a 7-1/2 
to 8 percent rate of inflation now. Do we as a group feel that this is preordained because 
of circumstances that we can't control? I'm concerned that we seem to feel well, it may be 
8 percent, and if it's 8 percent we've done our job well. I'm really not trying to be critical, 
but is our monetary policy responsibility such that we should maybe discuss whether 
we're satisfied to see the economy drift into an 8 percent inflation rate? And if not, are 
there things that we can do to affect this? … Are we in any way the masters of what 
happens, or are we merely observers on the sidelines? I'm lost. 
 
Miller: I take the fifth. 
 
Partee: I don't want to comment. (Transcript, 9/19/78, p. 17-18) 
 
Chairman G. William Miller (who had succeeded Burns early in 1978) eventually 
responded to the effect that the modest reduction in economic growth in recent quarters was a 
sign of success, that the Fed had to wait for the Administration to take the lead on fighting 
inflation, and that recession needed to be avoided at all cost (Transcript, 9/19/78, p. 17-18). 
By early 1978 signs of rapidly increasing inflationary pressures were becoming 
impossible to ignore. From 1978 to mid-1979 there were two impediments to the Fed’s taking 
action against inflation. First, the FOMC was unwilling to act against inflation without  
leadership from the Carter Administration. Second, the FOMC was unwilling to contract 
monetary policy enough to risk pushing the economy into recession. The result was policy 
paralysis. 
Chairman Miller, like Burns before him, believed that recessions worsened the problem 
of inflation by causing the government to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy which the Federal 
Reserve would have to accommodate (see e.g. Miller 1979, p. 3). This logic led Miller to argue 
against monetary restraint (see, for example, Transcript, 7/18/78, p. 42). Instead, Miller spent 
much of his term advocating for a coordinated assault on inflation, led by the Administration, 
with the Fed in a supporting role. Miller was frustrated at the Administration’s and Congress’ 
inaction. For him, a Fed-initiated attack on inflation would only be a last resort.  
 26
As an aftermath of a series of events over ten years, it’s hard to coalesce leadership in the 
government. It’s nobody’s fault, but there has been a fractionalization of leadership after 
all these events. Therefore, Congress doesn’t stick too much to anybody’s program…. 
And the Administration has many factions pushing it in this direction and that direction. I 
personally think time is very short for them to take some more believable steps in 
fighting inflation and if it’s not done, inflation is going to be left to the Federal Reserve 
and that’s going to be bad news. (Transcript, 3/21/78, p. 33) 
 
The FOMC therefore spent most of 1978 and early 1979 waiting for the Administration 
to act against inflation. The Administration announced anti-inflation programs in the spring and 
fall of 1978 which encouraged some on the Committee to advocate tougher action, but 
uncertainty over the Administration’s commitment to the programs prevented the Fed from 
beginning a major contraction. 
 By the summer of 1979 the rise in inflation was regarded as a real crisis. In June and July, 
for the first time, a number of members of the Committee began to argue that the Fed needed to 
take action even if it meant a greater risk of recession (see e.g.  Mr. Rankin, Transcript, 6/27/79, 
p. 6; Mr. Wallich, Transcript, 7/11/79, p. 15; Mr. Coldwell,  Transcript 7/11/79, p. 17). Paul 
Volcker was appointed Chairman in August, a clear signal that the Carter Administration 
expected the Fed to take action. In October the Fed initiated the contraction that would finally 
bring an end to the Great Inflation. 
2.6 The 1979-82 disinflation 
 From the first meeting at which Paul Volcker was chair he and other Committee members 
recognized the importance of public support for any serious attempt at controlling inflation. 
Throughout the disinflation period Committee members remained concerned about political 
support and took comfort in their perception that that support was forthcoming. Political support 
took two forms: a willingness of the public and political community to tolerate a recession as 
long as there was significant progress toward controlling inflation, and acceptance of the idea 
 27
that the Federal Reserve would exercise its responsibilities as guardian of price stability 
independently of the rest of government.  
 Chairman Volcker spoke at length about the challenges facing the Fed in the August 
meeting. He laid out a strategy in which the Fed would make a small move towards tightening 
immediately, but “we ought to keep our ammunition reserved as much as possible for more of a 
crisis situation where we have a rather clear public backing for whatever drastic action we take” 
(Transcript, 8/14/79, p. 22-23). An important consideration for Committee members as they 
geared up for an attack on inflation was their perception that the President, Congress, and public 
would support such a move. Mr. Mayo, for example, argued that the Fed should take advantage 
of the opportunity provided by a growing consensus that inflation was the country’s most serious 
problem. 
Inflation is our number one enemy. This has been declared far and wide, by the President 
of the United States and the leaders of the Congress as well as by the Federal Reserve… I 
think this is an opportunity, while everybody is hating inflation so much, to move ahead 
and tighten somewhat (Transcript, 8/14/79, p. 31) 
 
In the September meeting Chairman Volcker noted that the Fed had support for tightening from 
sources not ordinarily expected to be hawkish on inflation such as the Congressional Black 
Caucus. (Transcript, 9/18/79, p. 34) 
 When the decision to tighten dramatically was made in the October meeting, Chairman 
Volcker made a point of informing the Committee that there was strong support for a policy shift 
from the Administration (Transcript, 10/6/79, p. 9). Following the meeting Volcker made a 
number of public appearances at which he emphasized the political support for the Fed’s actions. 
Three days after the meeting, for example, Volcker spoke with the press following an address to 
the American Bankers’ Association.  
Restrictive monetary policies are never calculated to win popularity contests; yet there 
has been acceptance of the need of restraint even at rates of interest that are almost 
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outside the range of our historical experience. Indeed, the Congressional committees 
responsible for oversight of the Federal Reserve have been among the strongest voices 
urging that we set forth and adhere to monetary targets, reducing them over the years 
ahead as an essential part of the effort to restore price stability… I would note too that the 
“National Accord” recently reached between the Administration and American labor 
leadership plainly recognized the threat to full employment, incomes, investment, and 
growth inherent in the inflationary process, and for those reasons gave “top priority” to 
the “war on inflation”. (Volcker 1979, p. 5-6) 
 
 Maintaining political support for the program remained a priority and concern once the 
new policy was in place. In March, further signs that the economy was headed for a recession 
prompted a discussion about whether it might be prudent to pull back on the degree of restraint. 
Chairman Volcker argued that with the political support the Fed had for its current policies, such 
a move would be disastrous. 
The worst thing we could do is to indicate some backing-off at this point when we have 
announced anti-inflation program. We have political support and understanding for what 
we have been doing. People don’t expect it to be too easy. There is an understanding that 
a lot of burden has been placed on credit policy, and there’s a willingness to be 
supportive for the moment in that connection. I would not give all that much weight to 
the degree of support we’re going to get if this is dragged out indefinitely and we have to 
go through this process once again. (Transcript, 3/18/80, p. 36) 
 
 In the winter of 1980-81, gloomy economic statistics again prompted a discussion as to 
whether it was time for the Fed to reverse course. Chairman Volcker urged Committee members 
to stay the course, assuring them that there was still sufficient support for a reduction in 
monetary targets in Congress and in the Administration (Transcript, 2/2-3/81, p. 129). The 
meeting of July 1981 also saw a vigorous discussion of how long the Fed could hold out in its 
fight against inflation. Mr. Schultz argued that the public was growing impatient with the lack of 
success against inflation, and that the Committee needed to make a major push over the next four 
quarters to reduce inflation or see support for its program fall apart (Transcript, 7/6-7/81, p. 45). 
Mr. Guffey argued that at this point, given support from the Administration, the Committee 
should not make the type of mistake it had always made in the past. 
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Guffey: … Secondly, it does seem to me that we've made some real progress against 
inflation and that the public is at least willing to accept that… And one last observation…  
Historically, the Federal Reserve has always come up to the hitching post and then 
backed off simply because the Admistration and the Congress have thrown bricks at us or 
have not been supportive of a policy of restraint. Through the course of recent history at 
least, we've backed off and we've made a mistake each time. I think we have an 
opportunity this time to carry forward what we should have done before because for the 
first time ever we do have, for whatever length of time, the support of the Administration 
at least. So, we ought to take advantage of that opportunity. (Transcript, 7/6-7/81, p. 55) 
  
The Reagan tax cuts put the Fed in a familiar bind. In the past, it was understood that the 
Fed would accommodate rather than resist an expansionary fiscal policy designed to stimulate 
growth. This time, however, the Committee did not back off. In May 1981, for example, Mr. 
Solomon argued that the tax cuts and defense spending increases proposed by the Administration 
required the Fed to raise interest rates further than it would have done otherwise. “It seems to me 
that we are better off to be very firm and vigorous in our responses early in the game… I feel we 
are better off trying to nip this now than trying to be more gentle in our approach…” (Transcript, 
5/18/81, p. 25) 
The Fed’s response to the Reagan tax cuts is emblematic of the difference between 
Volcker’s attitude toward macroeconomic policy coordination and that of his predecessors. For 
Burns and Miller, the fact that monetary contraction alone was so costly made it necessary for 
government to take the lead in reducing inflation through fiscal and regulatory policies. 
Monetary policy would contract at a pace dictated by the government’s success in those areas. 
Volcker placed monetary policy at the forefront of the fight against inflation, with other policies 
treated as complementary. While challenging government to implement reforms in order to make 
the transition to low inflation as painless as possible, the Volcker Fed was willing to fight 
inflation by itself if necessary. 
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 By the end of 1981, Committee members were firm in their determination to carry 
through with the disinflation despite a serious recession that had already pushed the 
unemployment rate past 8 percent, and despite the lack of cooperation from the Reagan 
Administration. The contrast with 1970, 1973, and 1974 could not be more stark, and reflects the 
fact that by this time the political environment was such that the Fed now had a mandate to fight 
inflation at high cost and almost entirely on its own. The inflation rate began to fall quickly 
beginning in the first quarter of 1982, and by the end of the year the Fed was able to switch to an 
expansionary policy with inflation finally under control. 
3. THE MISMEASUREMENT AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS VIEWS 
Orphanides, Romer and Romer, and Nelson have argued that mismeasurement of the 
economy’s productive capacity and misunderstanding of the relationship between monetary 
policy and inflation were the primary causes of the poor monetary policy decisions that created 
the Great Inflation. The argument sketched out in the preceding section, by contrast, is that the 
impetus for adoption of overly expansionary policies at key turning points during the Great 
Inflation was political considerations, not technical errors. How do we reconcile these two 
views? 
The key point to make is that despite whatever misperceptions the Fed might have had, at 
none of the turning points identified above did the Fed embark on an expansionary policy in the 
belief that inflation was under control. This is evident from Figures 1-5. When the decision was 
made to ease beginning in spring 1970, for example, forecasts of inflation were higher than they 
had been at the beginning of the disinflation in late 1968. Inflation was suppressed due to price 
controls during the loose policy period in 1972. However, the Minutes for the 1972 meetings 
make clear that the Committee was aware that inflationary pressures remained strong. Members 
repeatedly expressed concern about stubbornly high inflation expectations and price increases in 
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some sectors such as food (e.g. Mr. Winn, Minutes 3/21/72, p. 69; Mr. Coldwell, Minutes 
4/18/72, p. 27; Mr. Robertson, Minutes 6/20/72, p. 78). The Fed eased policy in October 1973 at 
a time when its inflation forecasts hovered in the 5-6 percent range, compared to the 3-4 percent 
range at the time the disinflation attempt began. When the next disinflation attempt was 
abandoned in October 1974, one- to two-quarter ahead forecasts of inflation were near eight 
percent, up from six percent when the disinflation attempt began. Inflation forecasts rose 
continually through the loose policy period of 1977-78, and there are no statements in the 
Minutes and Transcripts from this period suggesting that Committee members thought 
inflationary pressures were weakening. 
There is also ample evidence that on those occasions when the Fed switched to a looser 
monetary policy it was aware of the tradeoff it was making between growth and inflation. In the 
meeting of November 1970, for example, the economic staff presented estimates that a higher 
rate of money supply growth would reduce unemployment by about half a percentage point 
relative to what it would be under more conservative policies, at the cost of an inflation rate 
about 0.2 percentage points higher. Mr. Partee argued that “this would be a price worth paying to 
halt the rise in the unemployment rate and to turn it down before next year is out.” (Minutes 
11/17/70, p. 35). Similar estimates were presented to the Committee in March 1973, as noted 
above, and at other times. 
The Fed’s overestimates of the economy’s productive capacity and its tendency to 
attribute much of the inflation of the period to nonmonetary factors probably caused it to 
underestimate the inflationary consequences of its actions. But ultimately the Fed chose to inflate 
at key turning points because of political considerations rather than technical errors. 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
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 In this section I test whether there is a statistical correlation between political pressures 
and monetary policy actions. My measure of political pressures is based on statements by 
members of the FOMC recorded in the minutes and transcripts of FOMC meetings over the 
period 1969 to 1982. I collected statements by participants of the meetings that refer to political 
implications of expansionary or contractionary monetary policy. I included statements referring 
to reactions on the part of the executive, Congress, or the public to FOMC policy choices as well 
as references to the priority these groups placed on unemployment versus inflation reduction. 
Statements were included whether the speaker indicated that the Fed should accommodate or 
resist the external pressures. 
 I found 140 statements which are collected in an Appendix available from the author. I 
created dummy variables equaling one in months when at least one statement of a particular type 
was made by a particular member of the FOMC and zero otherwise. Specifically, the variable 
LOOSE_CHAIR represents months in which the Fed Chair made statements referring to 
pressures in favor of loose (expansionary) policy or in opposition to tight (contractionary) policy 
(21 cases in the sample); TIGHT_CHAIR represents months in which the Fed Chair made 
statements referring to pressures in favor of tight policy or opposed to loose policy (17 cases); 
and LOOSE_OTHERS (44 cases) and TIGHT_OTHERS (19 cases) represent months in which 
similar statements were made by other members of the FOMC.7  
 Similar variables have been used in previous research that asks whether the banking 
industry, Congress and the executive branch (Havrilesky, 1993; Froyen et al., 1997) or non-
financial private sector groups (Weise, 2008) influence monetary policy decisions. In those 
papers dummy variables constructed from public statements by these groups are interpreted as 
signals of political pressure. The variables used in this paper are slightly different in that they 
                                                 
7 The number of cases adds up to less than 140 because some months contained multiple statements. 
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represent signals received or perceived by members of the FOMC rather than all signals sent by 
the groups seeking to influence monetary policy. I interpet the statements as evidence that the 
members of the FOMC were aware of external political pressures in one direction or the other 
during a given month.  
  Figures 6 and 7 plot the loose and tight statements made by the Chair and other members 
of the Committee. For the purpose of clarity loose statements are coded as -1 and tight 
statements as +1. Shaded areas in the graphs represent periods of loose and tight policy as 
defined in Table A1. As shown in Figure 6 there is some correspondence between signals 
reported by the Chair and the general stance of monetary policy: “loose” signals are reported 
more frequently in periods of loose policy while “tight” signals are somewhat more frequent 
during periods of tight policy. The correlation between the policy stance and signals reported by 
other committee members, shown in Figure 7, is weaker: signals tend to be distributed fairly 
evenly across policy stances. On close examination of both figures it appears that loose signals 
appear more frequently toward the end of contractionary periods and tight signals appear more 
frequently toward the end of expansionary periods. Such a pattern would be consistent with the 
hypothesis that major policy changes were driven in part by political pressures.  
 Tables 1A-1F quantify the correlation between the frequency of signals and the stance of 
monetary policy. Table 1A shows “contingency tables” for the frequency of loose and tight 
statements by the Fed Chair over periods of loose and tight monetary policy. The left half of 
Table 1A, for example, shows that of 21 statements by the Chair indicating pressure for loose 
policy, 19 of them occurred during periods of loose monetary policy and only two during periods 
of tight policy. The right half shows that of 17 statements by the Chair indicating pressure for 
tight policy, ten occurred during periods of tight policy and only seven during periods of loose 
policy.  
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 If loose and tight policy statements were distributed independently of the monetary policy 
stance, we would 90.1 no statement/loose policy combinations in the upper left quadrant of Table 
1A.8 Likewise we would expect 56.9 no statement/tight policy combinations, 12.9 loose 
statement/loose policy combinations, and 8.1 loose statement/tight policy combinations. 
Pearson’s c2 test compares the actual and expected count in each cell of the table to test 
independence (see Agresti, 1990, p. 47). For a 2x2 contingency table the test statistic is 
distributed c2 with one degree of freedom. The c2 test reported in Table 1A rejects the 
hypothesis that loose statements by the Chair and the policy stance are independent at the one 
percent significance level. It rejects the hypothesis that tight statements by the Chair and the 
policy stance are independent at the ten percent level. 
 We can also test directly the hypothesis that the probability of observing a signal is the 
same during periods of loose monetary policy and tight monetary policy. Let πi, i={L,T}, be the 
probability that a signal is observed during loose (L) or tight (T) periods. For a particular type of 
signal, say a statement from the Fed Chair indicating pressure for loose policy, we wish to test 
the hypothesis that πT-πL=0. The sample frequency pi has expected value πi and variance πi(1-
πi)/ni, where ni is the number of expansionary or contractionary periods in the sample. Then 
E(pT-pL)= πT-πL and V(pT-pL)= πT(1-πT)/nT+ πL(1-πL)/nL. We estimate the variance using sample 
frequencies. The test statistic z ൌ ୮Tି୮L
ඥVሺ୮Tି୮Lሻ
 is asymptotically distributed standard normal (see 
Agresti, 1990, p. 55). Tables 1A-1F report the z statistic and p-value for each case. In the left 
half of Table 1A, the probability of observing a loose statement is 0.18 (19/103) during loose 
periods versus 0.04 during tight periods. The z statistic for the difference in the frequency of 
loose statements is -3.51, meaning we reject the hypothesis that the probability of observing an 
easing or tightening signal from the Chair is the same across policy stances at the one percent 
                                                 
8 Prob(no statement)*Prob(loose policy) = (147/168)*(103/168) = 53.6 percent = 90.1 cases. 
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significance level. For the right half of the table, the probability of observing a tight signal is 
0.15 during tight periods and 0.07 during loose periods. The z statistic is 1.68, so we reject the 
hypothesis that the probability of a tight signal is equal across policy stances at the ten percent 
level. 
 Table 1B repeats these tests for statements made by FOMC members other than the 
Chair. While loose statements are more likely to occur during tight periods and tight statements 
are more likely to occur during tight periods, the differences are not statistically significant.  
 Tables 1C and 1D examine the frequency of statements during loose periods. In each 
contingency table, the first column refers to periods of expansionary monetary policy up to three 
months prior to a switch to contractionary policy. The second column refers to the three months 
leading up to and including a switch to tight policy. In all cases periods of tight policy other than 
the first period of a tight policy episode are excluded. The left half of Table 1C shows that of 17 
loose statements by the Chair during periods of expansionary policy, none occurred in the last 
three months of the period. The right half of Table 1C shows that four of nine tight statements 
occurred in the three months leading up to a decision to tighten. Statistical tests may be 
unreliable in this case because of the small number of pre-tightening periods and statements. 
Taken at face value, however, the tests indicate that we reject the hypothesis that the probability 
of observing these statements is equal early and late in an expansionary policy period. 
Specifically, statements referring to pressure for tightening occur with significantly higher 
probability during the three months preceding a switch to tight policy. Table 1D repeats the 
analysis for other members of the FOMC. While loose statements occur with lower probability 
and tight statements occur with higher probability in the three months prior to a tightening, the 
differences are not statistically significant. 
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 Finally, Tables 1E and 1F conduct a similar analysis for periods of contractionary 
monetary policy. Table 1E shows that loose statements by the Chair are proportionately more 
frequent in the three months leading up to a decision to switch to expansionary policy. The c2 
test rejects the hypothesis that the frequency of statements and the policy stance are independent, 
but the z test fails to reject the hypothesis that loose statements occur with the same frequency 
across policy stances. Statements referring to pressures to tighten are significantly more frequent 
in the three months prior to a decision to tighten. Table 1F shows that the same pattern exists for 
statements by other members of the Committee – loose statements are proportionately less 
frequent in the three months prior to a decision to tighten while tight statements are 
proportionately more frequent – but again the differences are not statistically significant.   
 The lesson from Table 1 is that periods of loose (tight) policy tend to coincide with 
periods in which the FOMC was aware of pressure for loose (tight) policy. Also, transitions from 
tight to loose or loose to tight policy tend to occurr shortly after the FOMC receives signals of 
political pressure for such a switch. The correlations are stronger for signals received by the 
Chair than for those received by other members of the Committee. 
It is possible that FOMC member statements and the Fed’s monetary policy stance are 
correlated simply because the Fed and political actors share a preferred monetary policy response 
to changes in unemployment and inflation. A key test of the hypothesis that Fed policy was 
affected by political considerations is to see if the correlation remains after controlling for the 
state of the macroeconomy. I therefore estimate a Taylor rule for the period of the Great 
Inflation, augmented by the FOMC statement dummy variables. The model is similar to that in 
Orphanides (2004). The Fed is assumed to adjust the federal funds rate target gradually toward 
its desir d  so 
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e level, that  
f୲T ൌ ρଵf୲ିଵT ൅ ρଶf୲ିଶT ൅ ሺ1 െ ρଵ െ ρଶሻൣα ൅ βπ୲,୦
ୣ െ γuො୲,୩
ୣ ൧ ൅ δX୲ ൅ ε୲ (1) 
The frequency of the data is FOMC meetings (so period t is the current FOMC meeting and t-1 is 
the previous meeting). The dependent variable f୲T is the midpoint of the target range for the 
federal funds rate. I use Greenbook forecasts as proxies for the Fed’s projections of future 
inflation and unemployment: π୲,୦ୣ  and uො୲,୩ୣ  are the average of the current- through h(k)-quarter 
ahead Greenbook inflation and unemployment gap forecasts available at the time t FOMC 
meeting. The unemployment gap is the Greenbook forecast of the unemployment rate minus the 
target rate of unemployment. I assume that the Fed’s target for unemployment is equal to four 
percent until January 1970, rises linearly from that date, reaches 6 percent in September 1979, 
and stays at that level through 1982. This progression reflects the conventional wisdom 
(documented in various issues of the Economic Report of the President and FOMC Minutes and 
Transcripts as well as in research by Orphanides and Williams (2002) that during the 1970s 
policymakers gradually became aware that the four percent unemployment target established in 
the 1960s was too low. The parameter α is the long-run average federal funds rate target, 
incorporating the Fed’s estimate of the natural real rate of interest and the target for inflation. 
Finally, Xt is a vector of dummy variables for statements about political pressures made during 
the period t FOMC meeting. 
I estimate equation (1) using nonlinear least squares for h=1, k=0. (Results are essentially 
the same for other choices of h and k.) Estimates of this regression are reported in Table 2. The 
first column shows the estimated regression excluding the statement dummies for the period 
January 1969 – September 1979. All coefficients have the expected signs and are precisely 
estimated. As in Orphanides (2004), the Fed is estimated to have followed a very activist policy 
as evidenced by the strength of the response to the unemployment gap. The results in Table 2 
show that the Fed followed a destabilizing monetary policy rule in that it raised the federal funds 
rate less than one-for-one in response to changes in expected inflation. This result is consistent 
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with that in Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000), but contrary to Orphanides’ findings. 
Experimentation with different model specifications showed that the difference is due to the use 
of the unemployment gap instead of the output gap as in the Orphanides paper; it is not due to 
the different frequency of data, choice of dependent variable, or sample range.  
The second column reports regression results for the same sample range with political 
statement dummy variables added. There is a strong correlation between political statements 
made by the Fed chair and monetary policy decisions: on average, controlling for the expected 
inflation rate and output gap, the federal funds rate target is set a quarter of a point lower when 
the Chair references political pressures towards loose policy in the FOMC meeting and a quarter 
of a point higher when he mentions pressures towards tight policy. Both of these effects are 
statistically significant at standard significance levels. Statements by other committee members 
referencing pressure for tight policy are associated with a federal funds target 18 basis points 
higher on average. This effect is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. References by 
other committee members to pressures for loose policy have essentially no effect. These results 
are consistent with the unconditional correlations discussed above. 
The last three columns of Table 2 report results for sample periods ending in December 
1980, December 1981, and December 1982 respectively. Adding data from the Volcker 
disinflation increases the estimate of the response to inflation, consistent with Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler’s finding that after 1979 the Fed adopted a stabilizing monetary policy rule. The evidence 
for political influence over the Fed’s policy decisions also weakens when we add data from the 
Volcker disinflation. The estimated effect of statements by the Chair referring to pressures for 
loose policy falls in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant. The estimated effect of 
tight policy statements by the Chair is somewhat stronger when the sample is extended, but this 
effect becomes statistically insignificant as well. There is wide variance across sample ranges in 
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estimates of the effect of loose policy statements by Committee members other than the chair: 
the effect is strong and statistically significant for the sample ending in December 1981, but not 
significant in samples ending in 1980 or 1982. The estimated effect of tight policy statements by 
others on the Committee is never statistically significant. One explanation for these results is that 
while there was a great deal of opposition to high interest rates during the disinflation, members 
of the FOMC believed that at a fundamental level and for a limited period of time the Fed had 
political support for continuing its tight policy. This explanation is consistent with the story told 
in the previous section.  
5. CONCLUSION  
This paper has presented narrative and econometric evidence that political constraints 
rather than misguided beliefs about the economy were responsible for the Federal Reserve’s 
overly expansionary policies during the 1970s. These findings have implications for control of 
inflation in the future. The lesson from the mismeasurement and misunderstandings views is that 
a repeat of the Great Inflation can be avoided by technocratic measures: better data 
measurement, a less activist policy rule, better models of the macroeconomy. The political 
constraints hypothesis, by contrast, suggests that the Great Inflation  was due to political 
pressures arising outside the Federal Reserve and would have occurred even if the Fed had 
wanted to adopt a thoroughly modern approach to economic stabilization. Maintaining control 
over inflation in the future requires maintaining public support for low inflation and, failing that, 
preserving the Fed’s institutional independence. In light of the dramatic expansion of the Fed’s 
balance sheet in response to the current economic crisis, a commitment to restraint will be 
especially important as the Fed unwinds its policies in years to come. 
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Figure 1. The 1969-70 disinflation. 
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Figure 2. The 1971-73 expansion. 
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Figure 3. The 1973-74 disinflations. 
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Figure 4. The 1976-78 expansion. 
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Figure 5. The 1979-82 disinflation. 
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Figure 6. Statements of political pressure from Chair 
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Figure 7. Statements of political pressure from other committee members 
 
Shaded areas: red = tightening periods, grey = easing periods 
-2
-1
0
1
2
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
EASE_OTHERS TIGHT_OTHERS
 
 46
Table 1A. Contingency table for political statements and policy stance 
P ta  P staoli
Loo
cy  nce
Tig
 
h
oli
Loo
cy s
s
nc
Tig
e 
  se t  Total e  ht Total
No statement  84 63  147 No statement 96  55 151
Chair (loose)  19 2  21   Chair (tight) 7  10 17
Total  103 65  168 Total 103  65 168
 
son c2(1) 
Z‐statistic 
 
(0.00) 
(0.00) 
 
3.23 
1.68 
Pear 8.61
‐3.51
Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
(0.07)
(0.09)
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Total  103 65  168 Total 103  65 168
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(0.28) 
(0.26) 
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Pear 1.19
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Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
(0.75)
(0.75)
 
 
1C. 
  P stolicy 
Loo
ance 
Last 
mo
P taolicy s
Loo
nce 
Last   
mo  se
3 
s.  Total se 
3
s. Total
No statement  77 9  86 No statement 89  5 94
Chair (loose)  17 0  17   Chair (tight) 5  4 9
Total  94 9  103 Total 94  9 103
 
son c2(1) 
Z‐statistic 
 
(0.16) 
(0.00) 
 
5.77 
2.34 
Pear 1.95
‐4.56
Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
1 (0.00)
(0.02)
 
 
1
 
D. 
  P stolicy 
Loo
ance 
Last 
mo
P taolicy s
Loo
nce 
Last   
mo  se
3 
s.  Total se 
3
s. Total
No statement  66 7  73 No statement 85  6 91
Other (loose)  28 2  30   Other (tight) 9  3 12
Total  94 9  103 Total 94  9 103
 
son c2 (1) 
Z‐statistic 
 
(0.63) 
(0.60) 
 
4.50 
1.48 
Pear 0.23
‐0.52
Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
(0.03)
(0.14)
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1
 
E. 
  P stolicy 
Tig
ance 
Las
m
P taolicy s
Tig
nce 
Las  
m  ht
t 3 
os.  Total ht 
t 3
os. Total
No statement  55 10  65 No statement 47  12 59
Chair (loose)  2 2  4   Chair (tight) 10  0 10
Total  57 12  69 Total 57  12 69
 
son c2(1) 
Z‐statistic 
 
(0.08) 
(0.23) 
 
2.46 
‐3.48 
Pear 3.14
1.19
Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
(0.12)
(0.00)
 
1
 
F. 
  P stolicy 
Tig
ance 
Last 
mo
P taolicy s
Tig
nce 
Las  
m  ht
3 
s.  Total ht 
t 3
os. Total
No statement  45 9  54 No statement 50  11 61
Other (loose)  12 3  15   Other (tight) 7  1 8
Total  57 12  69 Total 57  12 69
 
son c2 (1) 
Z‐statistic 
 
(0.76) 
(0.77) 
 
0.15 
‐0.43 
Pear 0.09
0.29
Pearson c2 (1)
Z‐statistic
(0.70)
(0.67)
 
Sample is 1969:01-1982:12. For 1C and 1D, loose periods only. For 1E and 1F, tight periods 
only. 
Pearson c2: test of independence (p‐value in parentheses). 
Z‐statistic: test of H0: frequency of statement|loose period = frequency of statement|tight 
period (p‐value in parentheses).  
See Agresti, Alan, Categorical Data Analysis, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990, pp. 47-48, 
55. 
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Table 2. Augmented T le regressions. aylor ru
Sample: 
 
1/13
9
/69‐
/17/79
1/13
9
/69‐
/17/79
1/13
12/
/69‐
15/80
1/13
12/
/69‐
21/81
1/13
12/
/69‐
20/82
ρ1 1.27 1.22 1.18 1.04 1.01
(11.24)
‐
(11.53)
‐
(6.06)
‐
(8.73)
‐
(9.69)
‐ρ2 0.41 0.38 0.33 0.17 0.12
(4.15) (3.93) (2.29) (1.38) (1.14)
α 4.99 5.98 4.10 4.24 4.25
(5.62) (6.93) (2.21) (1.77) (1.36)
β 0.66 0.44 0.89 0.99 0.94
(3.96)
‐1.5
(5.15
(2.46) (2.30) (2.09) (1.54)
γ 6 ‐1.44 ‐1.33 ‐1.60 ‐1.53
) (5.68) (4.18) (3.45) (2.59)
δLOOSE_CHAIR ‐‐ ‐0.26 ‐0.19 ‐0.10 ‐0.01
‐‐ (2.47) (1.65) (0.69) (0.06)
δTIGHT_CHAIR ‐‐ 0.24 0.54 0.50 0.41
‐‐ (2.09) (1.62) (1.65) (1.33)
δLOOSE_OTHERS ‐‐ 0.04 ‐0.27 ‐0.40 ‐0.28
‐‐ (0.47) (1.58) (2.07) (1.46)
δTIGHT_OTHERS ‐‐ 0
(1
.18 ‐0
(0
.04 ‐0
(0
.03 0.24
(0‐‐ .87) .26) .19) .91)
Observations 131 131 144 152 160
R2 0.96
1.19
(0.31)
0.97
0.59
(0.55)
0.95
1.01
(0.37)
0.95
0.33
(0.72)
0.94
0.15
(0.86)
Breusch-Godfrey LM 
(p-value) 
 
Dependent variable is midpoint of federal funds target. 114 observations. Newey-West t-
statistics in parentheses. 
Breusch-Godfrey LM test is F test of hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation. 
 
